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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In this consolidated appeal, Troy Gordon Harris challenges the district court's 
order denying his motions for credit for time served after revoking his periods of 
probation. On appeal, Mr. Harris asserts that the district court erred when, relying on 
the wrong statute, it failed to grant his request for credit for time served from the date 
that the bench warrants for probation violations were served. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In each of the cases consolidated for appeal, Mr. Harris filed two motions for 
credit for time served which, with the exception of the affidavits in support, were 
identical. (R., p.68.) The motions concerned, inter alia, the service of bench warrants 
for probation violations from the two cases while Mr. Harris was being held on a new 
charge in the Ada County Jail. (R., pp.42-43.) In the motions, he sought credit for time 
served in the Ada County Jail between the service of the Bannock County warrants on 
or about February 25, 2011, 1 and his transfer to the Bannock County Jail on 
November 9, 2011. (R., p.43.) 
In denying Mr. Harris request for credit for time served from the service of the 
bench warrants to his arrival at the Bannock County Jail, the district court, relying on 
Idaho Code§ 18-309, which governs pre-judgment credit for time served, reasoned that 
credit was not awardable because "the Defendant was already incarcerated in another 
1 An Arrest History issued by the Ada County Sheriff's Office shows that Mr. Harris was 
arrested on the bench warrant for probation violation issued in Bannock County Case 
No. 2009-3447-FE on February 24, 2011, and arrested on the bench warrant for 
probation violation issued in Bannock County Case No. 2009-14021-FE on February 25, 
2011. (R., p.45.) 
1 
county on separate charges when he was served with the Bannock County bench 
warrants." (R., p.96.) 
Mr. Harris filed a timely Amended Notice of Appeal from the Decision on Second 
Motion for Credit for Time Served. (R., p.206.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when, applying the wrong statute, it denied Mr. Harris' motions 
for credit for time served from the date of service of bench warrants for his probation 
violations? 
3 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When, Applying The Wrong Statute, It Denied Mr. Harris' 
Motions For Credit For Time Served From The Date Of Service Of Bench Warrants For 
His Probation Violations 
A. Introduction 
In denying Mr. Harris' motions for credit for time served following the service of 
bench warrants for his probation violations, the district court, applying the wrong statute, 
concluded, "As the charges from Bannock County were not the cause of Defendant's 
incarceration in Ada County and had no direct effect on his liberty, he cannot receive 
credit for time served in Ada County towards his sentence on the Bannock County 
charges." (R., p.98.) The statute relied upon by the district court contains a limitation 
on credit for time served not applicable to the statute governing credit for time served for 
post-judgment incarceration. Analyzing Mr. Harris' claim under the proper statute, it 
becomes clear that he is entitled to an additional 256 days of credit in each of his cases. 
B. The District Court Erred When, Applying The Wrong Statute, It Denied Mr. Harris' 
Motions For Credit Time Served From The Date Of Service Of Bench Warrants 
For His Probation Violations 
Idaho Code § 19-2603, which governs post-judgment credit for time served, 
provides: 
When the defendant is brought before the court in such case, it may, if 
judgment has been withheld, pronounce any judgment which it could 
originally have pronounced, or, if judgment was originally pronounced but 
suspended, the original judgment shall be in full force and effect and may 
be executed according to law, and the time such person shall have been 
at large under such suspended sentence shall not be counted as a part of 
the term of his sentence, but the time of the defendant's sentence shall 
count from the date of the service of such bench warrant. 
I.C. § 19-2603 (emphasis added). 
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Idaho Code § 18-309, which governs pre-judgment credit for time served, in 
relevant part provides, "In computing the term of imprisonment, the person against 
whom the judgment was entered, shall receive credit in the judgment for any period of 
incarceration prior to entry of judgment, if such incarceration was for the offense or an 
included offense for which the judgment was entered .... " I.C. § 18-309 (emphasis 
added). 
In State v. McCarthy, 145 Idaho 397 (Ct. App. 2008), cited in Mr. Harris' motion 
and in the district court's order denying his motion (R., pp.95-96), the Court of Appeals 
explained, 
[C]redit must be given for jail incarceration after arrest for a probation 
violation. This is mandated by I.C. § 19-2603, which provides that when a 
defendant has been arrested on a bench warrant for a probation violation 
and probation has consequently been revoked, "the time of the 
defendant's sentence shall count from the date of service of such bench 
warrant." 
McCarthy, 145 Idaho at 398 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). The terms of 
Idaho Code § 19-2603 apply to "the functional equivalent of a bench warrant," as well. 
State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 171 (Ct. App. 2006). 
In denying Mr. Harris' motion for credit for time served between the service of the 
bench warrants for probation violations on or about February 25, 2011, and his transfer 
to the Bannock County Jail on November 9, 2011, the district court confined its analysis 
to Idaho Code § 18-309 and cases interpreting that statute, and completely ignored the 
applicability of Idaho Code § 19-2603 to Mr. Harris' motion.2 (R., pp.95-98.) Idaho 
Code § 18-309, by its plain language, applies only when calculating prejudgment credit 
for time served. I.C. § 18-309; see also State v. Lively, 131 Idaho 279, 280 (Ct. App. 
5 
1998) (explaining that I.C. § 18-309 "does not directly address the question of credit for 
time served after an entry of judgment for defendants, who, like Lively, have been 
placed on probation but ultimately have had their probation revoked.") (emphasis in 
original). The "for the offense" language in Idaho Code § 18-309 has been interpreted 
as precluding credit for time served in a second case when the defendant is arrested on 
the second case while already incarcerated on the first. See State v. Vasquez, 142 
Idaho 67, 68 (Ct. App. 2005) ("[T]here must be a causal effect between the offense and 
the incarceration in order for the incarceration to be 'for' the offense, as the term is used 
in I.C. § 18-309.") (citations omitted). 
Idaho Code § 19-2603, by its plain language, applies when calculating credit for 
time served from the service of a bench warrant for probation violation when probation 
is later revoked, and does not contain the "for the offense" limitation provided in 
I.C. § 18-309 or any other language limiting the credit required to be awarded. 
I.C. § 19-2603. Mr. Harris is entitled to credit for time served from the date that the 
bench warrants for his probation violations were served, which is, according to the 
undisputed record in this case, no later than February 25, 2011. He was not given 
credit for the time between the service of the bench warrants on or about February 25, 
2011, and his arrival at the Bannock County Jail on November 9, 2011. (R., pp.95-96.) 
The district court, relying on the incorrect statute for determining post-judgment 
credit for time served, improperly denied Mr. Harris post-judgment credit for time served 
in the amount of 256 days (excluding the credit he received for the date of his arrival at 
the Bannock County Jail on November 9, 2011 ). The only appropriate remedy is for this 
2 The district court did not completely ignore the existence of Idaho Code § 19-2603, as 
its citation to McCarthy indicated that the passage it quoted from McCarthy was itself 
quoting Idaho Code§ 19-2603. (R., p.96.) 
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Court to vacate the district court's Decision on Second Motion for Credit for Time 
, and remand this matter to the district court with instructions that it enter orders 
granting an additional 256 days of credit in each of the two cases. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Harris respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate the district court's Decision on Second Motion for Credit for Time Served, and 
remand this matter for entry of orders granting him an additional 256 days of credit in 
each of his two cases. 
DATED this 15th day of July, 2014. 
SPEN.C8R J. HAHN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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